Thomas Van Himbeeck

We consider the security of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols consisting of a finite number of rounds. We provide a security proof that is both and provides tight finite-size correction terms. In particular, when expanded in the block length $n$, the rate of randomness generation has the optimal asymptotic rate and optimal leading-order finite-size correction term. The proof is also general, applying to generic randomness generation and QKD protocols that have fully characterized devices and consist of a finite number of rounds.

**merged with** Thomas Van Himbeeck and Stefano Pironio. Correlations and Randomness Generation based on an Energy Constraint In a previous paper, we introduced a semi-device-independent scheme consisting of an untrusted source sending quantum states to an untrusted measuring device, with the sole assumption that the average energy of the states emitted by the source is bounded. Given this energy constraint, we showed that certain correlations between the source and the measuring device can only occur if the outcomes of the measurement are non-deterministic, i.e., these correlations certify the presence of randomness. In the present paper, we go further and show how to quantify the randomness as a function of the correlations and prove the soundness of a QRNG protocol exploiting this relation. For this purpose, we introduce (1) a semidefinite characterization of the set of quantum correlations, (2) an algorithm to lower-bound the Shannon entropy as a function of the correlations and (3) a proof of soundness using finite trials compatible with our energy assumption.

The pursuit of tight finite-key analysis for general QKD protocols is an exciting but challenging task for theorists. Entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) was developed recently and been successfully applied to device-independent QKD protocols. In the present work, we use EAT to prove the security of a very large class of entanglement-based QKD protocols, covering most discrete-variable protocols as well as their optical implementations.

In this work, we provide a complete, unconditional, asymptotic security analysis of DMCVQKD with four or more states. We do not need the photon-number cut-off assumption required in previous proofs. We derive inequalities that relate the result of a suitably chosen finite-dimensional optimization to the key rate. We solve the optimization numerically and utilize uniform continuity bounds to derive tight key rate lower bounds. We find that the key rates are comparable to previous conditional security proofs with the cut-off assumption, and to those achieved by Gaussian-modulated CVQKD.

A numerical approach for the calculation of QKD key rates allows a uniform framework to be applied to general QKD protocols. Based on our group's previous work, we would like to build a universal software platform that is fully modularized and user-friendly, where one can easily swap in and out different QKD protocol descriptions, channel simulation models or experimental data, backend numerical solvers, and parameter optimization algorithms. Our goal is to build an open-source platform that can be both useful for theorists testing new protocols as well as experimentalists looking for optimal parameters or analyzing their experimental data.