43
collaborators
2019–2026
years active
Contributions
QIP QCrypt TQC talk poster presenter award · △program ◇steering ○organizing · filled = chair
2 Talks
| Title | Conference | Type | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|---|
| Composable discrete-modulated continuous-variable QKD and its application to urban atmospheric channels | QCRYPT 2024 | regular | Kevin Jaksch, Thomas Dirmeier, Jan Schreck, Yannick Weiser, Stefan Richter, Ömer Bayraktar, Bastian Hacker, Conrad Rößler, Imran Khan, Andrej Kržič, Markus Rothe, Markus Leipe, Nico Döll, Christopher Spiess, Matthias Goy, Stefan Petscharning, Thomas Grafenauer, Bernhard Ömer, Christoph Pacher, Florian Kanitschar, Jie Lin, Norbert Lütkenhaus, Gerd Leuchs, Christoph Marquardt |
In our work, we developed an optical CVQKD system that uses polarization-based QPSK modulation designed for atmospheric quantum communication and a corresponding post-processing pipeline including error correction and privacy amplification. In a first laboratory experiment, we applied the security statement of a recently published security proof to calculate composable key rates with a total security parameter of ε = 1e-10 in the finite size regime against i.i.d. collective attacks. We also used the post-processing pipeline to study the effect of error correction and frame errors on the actual key extraction in a finite-size system – finding that the common approach of going to high frame errors to increase the ECC efficiency β does not optimize the extractable key length.Furthermore, we deployed the system over an ad-hoc atmospheric channel of 1.7 km in Mai 2023 in the city of Jena, Germany. In a first proof-of-principle study, we were able to apply the full optical and post-processing pipeline to extract pseudo-asymptotic keys and discuss the further steps necessary to move the system to the finite-size regime. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first CVQKD demonstration over a real atmospheric channel combining both the new class of DMCVQKD security proofs without Gaussian optimality and error correction steps. |
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| Security Proofs for QKD Protocols in Infinite Dimensions | QCRYPT 2021 | invited ▸ presenter | — |
8 Posters
| Title | Conference | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|
| Majorization theory for quasiprobabilities | QIP 2026 | Zacharie Van Herstraeten, Jack Davis, Oliver Hahn, Nikolaos Koukoulekidis, Ulysse Chabaud |
| Demonstration of free-space discrete-modulated continuous-variable QKD using real error correction codes and finite-size effects | QCRYPT 2023 | Kevin Jaksch, Thomas Dirmeier, Yannick Weiser, Stefan Richter, Ömer Bayraktar, Bastian Hacker, Conrad Rößler, Imran Khan, Stefan Petscharning, Thomas Grafenauer, Bernhard Ömer, Christoph Pacher, Florian Kanitschar, Jie Lin, Norbert Lütkenhaus, Gerd Leuchs, Christoph Marquardt |
Besides discrete-variable QKD, where single photon detection is used, continuous-variable (CV) protocols are using homodyne detection and are thus promising to be compatible with existing classical coherent communication technology. Originally, the research on CV QKD protocols mostly focused on Gaussian modulation (see review [1]), where one assumes that Alice can continuously displace coherent states according to a 2D Gaussian distribution. This modulation allows the security proofs to take advance of Gaussian optimality conditions, but experimental implementations can only reach this pattern up to some finite discretization. Another approach is to directly use a discrete-modulated (DM) CV QKD protocol. Here, Alice is required to prepare a finite number of displaced coherent states, aiming for a higher experimental simplicity, with the drawback of higher theoretical complexity. Recently, new security proofs such as [2] and corresponding experiments [3,4] could show the feasibility of systems using quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) with 64 and 256 displaced states. However, the security proof was limited to the asymptotic regime and since the experiments did not use implemented error correction codes, one could only estimate the achievable key rates, but could not generate the secret key itself. In this poster, we demonstrate experiments with a protocol with a smaller constellation size of four coherent states that share the same amplitude but are shifted by 90° in phase (QPSK modulation). We exploit a recently published security proof providing tight secret key rates for collective attacks even in the finite size regime [5]. Furthermore, we show that the QPSK data is compatible with our implemented low density parity check (LDPC) codes for binary symmetric channels. This allows us to perform the full QKD protocol from experimental quantum state exchange to classical post processing and to generate a secret key shared between Alice and Bob. For this purpose, we use a laboratory system based on polarization encoding in the Stokes parameters which is equivalent to a QPSK pattern in phase space. This scheme is designed to cope with the challenges of a turbulent atmospheric channel. While the fluctuating nature of such a channel can be targeted by sub-binning the transmission channels [6], the atmosphere is in general non-birefringent, allowing for atmospheric quantum communications [7]. [1] F. Laudenbach et al., Adv. Quantum Technol. 1, 1800011 (2018) [2] A. Denys et al., Quantum 5, 540 (2021) [3] F. Roumestan et al., arXiv:2207.11702 (2022) [4] Y. Pan et al., Optics Letters 47, 3307-3310 (2022) [5] F. Kanitschar et al., arXiv:2301.08686v1 (2023) [6] V. Usenko et al., New J. Phys. 14, 093048 (2012) [7] B. Heim et al., New J. Phys. 16, 113018 (2014) |
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| Finite-Size Security Proof for Discrete-Modulated Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution | QCRYPT 2022 | Florian Kanitschar, Jie Lin, Ian George, Norbert Lütkenhaus |
| An Open-source Software Platform for Numerical Key Rate Calculation of General Quantum Key Distribution Protocols | QCRYPT 2021 | Wenyuan Wang, Jie Lin, Ian George, Adam Winick, Shlok Ashok Nahar, Kai-Hong Li, Kun Fang, Natansh Mathur, John Burniston, Max Chemtov, Shahabeddin M. Aslmarand, Yanbao Zhang, Christopher Boehm, Patrick Coles, Norbert Lütkenhaus |
In this work, we present an open-source software platform that calculates key rate for general QKD protocols, building upon the numerical framework proposed by our group that can perform automated security proof of QKD protocols. The software platform is fully modularized with mutually independent modules for descriptions of protocols/channels, solvers for bounding key rate, and parameter optimization algorithms. It currently supports BB84 and measurement-device-independent QKD (including decoy states), as well as discrete-modulated continuous variable QKD. It also supports finite-size analysis for non-decoy-state protocols. We hope that the open-sourcing can attract theorists to test new protocols and/or contribute to new solvers, as well as appeal to experimentalists who wish to analyze their data or optimize parameters for new experiments. |
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| Towards an Open-source Software Platform for Numerical Key Rate Calculation of General Quantum Key Distribution Protocols | QCRYPT 2020 | Jie Lin, Ian George, Kai-Hong Li, Kun Fang, Natansh Mathur, Max Chemtov, Shlok Ashok Nahar, Shahabeddin M. Aslmarand, Thomas Van Himbeeck, Yanbao Zhang, Christopher Boehm, Patrick Coles, Adam Winick, Wenyuan Wang, Norbert Lütkenhaus |
A numerical approach for the calculation of QKD key rates allows a uniform framework to be applied to general QKD protocols. Based on our group's previous work, we would like to build a universal software platform that is fully modularized and user-friendly, where one can easily swap in and out different QKD protocol descriptions, channel simulation models or experimental data, backend numerical solvers, and parameter optimization algorithms. Our goal is to build an open-source platform that can be both useful for theorists testing new protocols as well as experimentalists looking for optimal parameters or analyzing their experimental data. |
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| Security Proof for Discrete-Modulated Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution without Photon-Number Cut-off Assumption | QCRYPT 2020 | Thomas Van Himbeeck, Jie Lin, Norbert Lütkenhaus |
In this work, we provide a complete, unconditional, asymptotic security analysis of DMCVQKD with four or more states. We do not need the photon-number cut-off assumption required in previous proofs. We derive inequalities that relate the result of a suitably chosen finite-dimensional optimization to the key rate. We solve the optimization numerically and utilize uniform continuity bounds to derive tight key rate lower bounds. We find that the key rates are comparable to previous conditional security proofs with the cut-off assumption, and to those achieved by Gaussian-modulated CVQKD. |
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| Security analysis of discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution | QCRYPT 2020 | Jie Lin, Norbert Lütkenhaus |
Discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols are favorable due to the experimental simplicity and inherited properties of continuous-variable protocols. We provide a tight numerical key rate analysis of discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocols in the asymptotic limit against collective attacks. As a specific example, we analyze the key rate of the quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK) scheme in both the paranoid and realistic scenarios. When the detector noises are trusted, the QPSK scheme is expected to reach around 100 km with currently feasible experimental parameters. For both scenarios, we also investigate the performance of post-selection of data for the reverse reconciliation scheme and show that post-selection can provide improvements in the key rate as well as reducing the amount of data for post-processing. |
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| Asymptotic security analysis of discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution | QCRYPT 2019 | Jie Lin, Norbert Lütkenhaus |
Collaborators
| Co-author | Joint talks |
|---|---|
| Jie Lin | 8 |
| Norbert Lütkenhaus | 8 |
| Florian Kanitschar | 3 |
| Ian George | 3 |
| Adam Winick | 2 |
| Bastian Hacker | 2 |
| Bernhard Ömer | 2 |
| Christoph Marquardt | 2 |
| Christoph Pacher | 2 |
| Christopher Boehm | 2 |
| Conrad Rößler | 2 |
| Gerd Leuchs | 2 |
| Imran Khan | 2 |
| Kai-Hong Li | 2 |
| Kevin Jaksch | 2 |
| Kun Fang | 2 |
| Max Chemtov | 2 |
| Natansh Mathur | 2 |
| Patrick Coles | 2 |
| Shahabeddin M. Aslmarand | 2 |