Supartha Podder

Abstract Aaronson and Ambainis (2009) and Chailloux (2018) showed that fully symmetric (partial) functions do not admit exponential quantum query speedups. This raises a natural question: how symmetric must a function be before it cannot exhibit a large quantum speedup? In this work, we prove that hypergraph symmetries in the adjacency matrix model allow at most a polynomial separation between randomized and quantum query complexities. We also show that, remarkably, permutation groups constructed out of these symmetries are essentially the only permutation groups that prevent super-polynomial quantum speedups. We prove this by fully characterizing the primitive permutation groups that allow super-polynomial quantum speedups. In contrast, in the adjacency list model for bounded-degree graphswhere graph symmetry is manifested differentlywe exhibit a property testing problem that shows an exponential quantum speedup. These results resolve open questions posed by Ambainis, Childs, and Liu (2010) and Montanaro and de Wolf (2013).

Quantum cryptography is known for enabling functionalities that are unattainable using classical information alone. Recently, Secure Software Leasing (SSL) has emerged as one of these areas of interest. Given a target circuit C from a circuit class, SSL produces an encoding of C which enables the evaluation of C, and also enables a verify procedure, by which the originator of the software becomes convinced that the software is returned --- meaning that the recipient has relinquished the possibility of any further use of the software. Clearly, such functionality is unachievable using classical information alone, since it is impossible to prevent a user from keeping a copy of the software. Recent results have shown the achievability of SSL using quantum information for a class of functions called compute-and-compare (these are a generalization of the well-known point functions). These prior works, however, all make use of setup or computational assumptions. Here, we show that SSL is achievable for compute-and-compare circuits without any assumptions. Our technique is a generic reduction from any quantum message authentication code to such an SSL scheme. Along the way, we also show that point functions can be copy-protected without any assumptions, for a security definition that involves one honest and one malicious evaluator.

In 2004, Aaronson introduced the complexity class PostBQP~(BQP with postselection) and showed that it is equal to PP. Following their line of work, we introduce two new complexity classes. The first, CorrBQP, is a modification of BQP which has the power to perform correlated measurements, i.e. measurements that output the same value across a partition of registers. The second, MajBQP, augments BQP with the ability to collapse a qubit to its most likely outcome. We exactly characterize the models, showing MajBQP = CorrBQP = BPP^PP = P^PP. This characterization allows us to obtain a derandomization of BPP with respect to a PP oracle. In fact, we show that other metaphysical modifications of BQP, such as CBQP (i.e. BQP with the ability to clone arbitrary quantum states), are also equal to P^PP. We show that CorrBQP is self-low with respect to classical queries. In contrast, if it were self-low under quantum queries, the counting hierarchy (CH) would collapse to P^PP. Furthermore, we introduce a variant of rational degree that lower-bounds the query complexity of P^PP. Lastly, we extend the adversary lower-bounding technique to AdPDQP, BQP with the ability to sample the current state of the algorithm and adapt the computation based on the samples.

Quantum cryptography is known for enabling functionalities that are unattainable using classical information alone. Recently, Secure Software Leasing (SSL) has emerged as one of these areas of interest. Given a target circuit C from a circuit class, SSL produces an encoding of C that enables a recipient to evaluate C, and also enables the originator of the software to verify that the software has been returned --- meaning that the recipient has relinquished the possibility of any further use of the software. Clearly, such a functionality is unachievable using classical information alone, since it is impossible to prevent a user from keeping a copy of the software. Recent results have shown the achievability of SSL using quantum information for a class of functions called compute-and-compare (these are a generalization of the well-known point functions). These prior works, however all make use of setup or computational assumptions. Here, we show that SSL is achievable for compute-and-compare circuits without any assumptions. Our technique involves the study of quantum copy-protection, which is a notion related to SSL, but where the encoding procedure inherently prevents a would-be quantum software pirate from splitting a single copy of an encoding for C into two parts, each of which enables a user to evaluate C. We show that point functions can be copy-protected without any assumptions, for a novel security definition involving one honest and one malicious evaluator; this is achieved by showing that from any quantum message authentication code, we can derive such an honest-malicious copy-protection scheme. We then show that a generic honest-malicious copy-protection scheme implies SSL; by prior work, this yields SSL for compute-and-compare functions.

One of the most intriguing problem in computer science is the Graph Isomorphism Problem: determining whether two finite graphs are isomorphic. The Subgraph Isomorphism Problem is a generalization of the Graph Isomorphism Problem where one asks whether a graph H is isomorphic to a subgraph of another graph G. Formally, let $H$ be a (non-empty) graph on $n$ vertices, possibly containing isolated vertices.. Let $f_H(G) = 1$ iff the input graph $G$ on $n$ vertices contains $H$ as a (not necessarily induced) subgraph. Let $\alpha_H$ denote the cardinality of a maximum independent set of $H$. In this work we show: \[Q(f_H) = \Omega\left( \sqrt{\alpha_H \cdot n}\right),\] where $Q(f_H)$ denotes the quantum query complexity of $f_H$. As a consequence we obtain a lower bounds for $Q(f_H)$ in terms of several other parameters of $H$ such as the average degree, minimum vertex cover, chromatic number, and the critical probability. We also use the above bound to show that $Q(f_H) = \Omega(n^{3/4})$ for any $H$, improving on the previously best known bound of $\Omega(n^{2/3})$. Until very recently, it was believed that the quantum query complexity is at least square root of the randomized one. Our $\Omega(n^{3/4})$ bound for $Q(f_H)$ matches the square root of the current best known bound for the randomized query complexity of $f_H$, which is $\Omega(n^{3/2})$ due to Gr\"oger. Interestingly, the randomized bound of $\Omega(\alpha_H \cdot n)$ for $f_H$ still remains open. We also study the Subgraph Homomorphism Problem, denoted by $f_{[H]}$, and show that $Q(f_{[H]}) = \Omega(n)$. Finally we extend our results to the $3$-uniform hypergraphs. In particular, we show an $\Omega(n^{4/5})$ bound for quantum query complexity of the Subgraph Isomorphism, improving on the previously known $\Omega(n^{3/4})$ bound. For the Subgraph Homomorphism, we obtain an $\Omega(n^{3/2})$ bound for the same.