Yasser Omar

Analytical and algebraic geometry are valuable tools for dealing with problems involving analytical functions and polynomials. In what we connote as spatial quantum sensing the goal is, given an underlying field and a set of quantum sensors interrogating the field in a set of positions, to find an estimator for some property the field. This property can have multiple forms, be it distinguishing the source of a target signal, or evaluating the field (or a derivative thereof) in an arbitrary position. In this work we also link this problem to the development of networks of quantum sensors, and the role and usefulness of entangling these sensors. We find that the estimators that come out as a solution to the problem are such that a non-local entangled strategy provides maximum precision. We start by working under the assumption of polynomial fields, which relates to the interpolation problem, and then generalize for any signal that is modeled via analytical functions, giving rise to any general least-squares estimator. We discuss the effects of the placement of the sensors in the estimation, namely, how to find well defined, construction error-free placements for the sensors. In the case of interpolation we provide concrete examples and proofs in a $m$-dimensional array of sensors, and discuss necessary and sufficient conditions for the more general cases. We provide clear examples of the possible use-cases and statements, and compare a non-local entangled strategy with the best local strategy for an interpolation problem, showing the benefit in terms of precision in a distributed sensing scenario. This is a key tool for a wide-range of problem in sensing problems, ranging from large-scale such as earth-sized experiments, to local-scale, such has biological experiments.

Over the last decades, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has risen as a promising solution for secure communications, a pressing subject in the aftermath of the security threat posed by Quantum Computers and the Shor's Algorithm. Offering a theoretically secure way to share secret keys between parties, QKD state of the art has witnessed remarkable progress in the last years. Nonetheless, although theoretically secure, QKD is not implementation-secure and until now, the study of physical vulnerabilities in QKD setups has mainly focused on the optical channel. The concept of attacking a cryptographic system via its physical characteristics and associated leakages, known as side-channel analysis, was firstly introduced in classical cryptography, with the seminal work of Paul Kosher. Since then, power and electromagnetic side-channel analysis have become a staple in classical cryptanalysis. However, these concepts have hardly been applied to QKD. In this work, we propose and implement a new method for side-channel analysis on QKD systems, by exploiting the power consumption of the electronic driver controlling the electro-optical components of the QKD transmitter. For high-rate transmission, QKD modules typically require electronic drivers, such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Here, we will show that the FPGA's power consumption can leak information about the QKD operation, and consequently the transmitted key. The analysis was performed on the QKD transmitter at the University of Padua. Our results are consistent and show critical information leakage, having reached a maximum accuracy of 73.35% in the prediction of transmitted random keys at 100 MHz repetition frequency.