Lars Kamin

We develop a flexible and robust framework for finite-size security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols under coherent attacks, applicable to both fixed- and variable-length protocols. Our methods achieve high finite-size key rates across a broad class of protocols while imposing minimal requirements. In particular, it eliminates the need for restrictive assumptions such as limited repetition rates or the implementation of virtual tomography procedures. To achieve this goal, we introduce new numerical techniques for the evaluation of conditional sandwiched Renyi entropies, enabling tight key rate bounds without compromising generality. In doing so, we find an alternative formulation of the ``QKD cone'' studied in previous work, which may be of independent interest. Moreover, we illustrate the versatility of our framework by applying it to several practically relevant protocols, including decoy-state protocols. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to accommodate realistic device imperfections, such as independent intensity and phase imperfections. Overall, our framework provides both greater scope of applicability and better key rates than existing techniques, especially for small block sizes, offering a scalable path toward secure quantum communication under realistic conditions.

Proving the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols against arbitrary attacks is a challenging task for arbitrary protocols. Here, we accomplish this task by extending and improving both the decoy-state analysis against collective attacks, and the postselection technique to uplift this security proof to arbitrary attacks. First, we improve the postselection technique - both by improving the cost paid for the uplift, and by rigorously showing how it can be applied to generic optical protocols. Second, we fundamentally improve the decoy-state analysis in such a way that we require only one decoy intensity to achieve the same performance as prior analysis with two decoy intensities. This has two consequences - it makes the protocol easier to practically implement, and reduces the penalty incurred by using the postselection technique. Third, we extend the finite-size QKD analysis to decoy-state protocols and generically improve the finite-size correction terms that appear. Thus, we provide a full security proof against arbitrary attacks for generic decoy-state protocols.

We discuss the status of security proofs for practical decoy-state Quantum Key Distribution using the BB84 protocol, pertaining to optical implementations using weak coherent pulses and threshold photo-detectors. Our focus is on the gaps in the existing literature. Gaps might result, for example, from a mismatch of protocol detail choices and proof technique elements, from proofs relying on earlier results that made different assumptions, or from protocol choices that do not consider real-world requirements. While substantial progress has been made, our overview draws attention to the details that still require our attention.

While most current quantum network nodes are connected via fiber-based or free-space fixed point-to-point links, there have been many advancements in the last decade that expand these nodes to include mobile, re-configurable, and wireless platforms such as uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellites. The size, weight, and power (SWaP) restrictions of these platforms pose constraints that potentially impact the system performance of mobile nodes. Here, we will discuss our progress towards developing a low-SWaP mobile quantum key distribution (QKD) platform that can exchange quantum-secured random keys between both drones and cars. We implement a finite-key security proof that incorporates system imperfections in state preparation and analysis, including channel losses. These imperfections, present in any system, require consideration during key consolidation to minimize information leakage. We demonstrate average finite secure key rates between mobile platforms up to 19.6 kbit/s.

The security analysis of many protocols relies on closed form bounds on entropic quantities that model devices. These closed form expressions can typically only be found by exploiting some sort of symmetry not present in many realistic unstructured QKD protocols. Our software provides a framework for efficiently evaluating secret key rates of generic unstructured QKD protocols with tighter lower bounds while providing more flexible and realistic modelling capabilities. Through its modular structure, our software package breaks down the task of constructing a (numerical) security proof into well defined domains including protocol design, modelling implementations, security frameworks, and numerical optimization, each of which has its own community of experts. By utilizing modules built by these communities, we aim to facilitate wide spread collaboration throughout the QKD community. The newly expanded and redesigned software is expected to be released early May 2024.

An important goal in quantum key distribution (QKD) is the task of providing a finite-size security proof without the assumption of collective attacks. For prepare-and-measure QKD, one approach for obtaining such proofs is the generalized entropy accumulation theorem (GEAT), but thus far it has only been applied to study a small selection of protocols. In this work, we present techniques for applying the GEAT in finite-size analysis of generic prepare-and-measure protocols, with a focus on decoy-state protocols. In particular, we present an improved approach for computing entropy bounds for decoy-state protocols, which has the dual benefits of providing tighter bounds than previous approaches (even asymptotically) and being compatible with methods for computing min-tradeoff functions in the GEAT. Furthermore, we develop methods to incorporate some improvements to the finite-size terms in the GEAT, and implement techniques to automatically optimize the min-tradeoff function. Our approach also addresses some numerical stability challenges specific to prepare-and-measure protocols, which were not addressed in previous works.

An important goal in quantum key distribution (QKD) is the task of providing a finite-size security proof without assuming that the states across the protocol rounds are independent and identically distributed (IID). For prepare-and-measure QKD, one recently developed approach for obtaining such proofs is the generalized entropy accumulation theorem (GEAT), but thus far it has only been applied to study a small selection of protocols. In this work, we present techniques for applying the GEAT in finite-size analysis of generic prepare-and-measure protocols, incorporating several methods to optimize the min-tradeoff function and minimize the second-order term in the GEAT. As a particular focus, we analyze decoy-state protocols and present a method for generically obtaining min-tradeoff functions for such protocols, even those where a closed-form expression for the asymptotic rate is not known. Furthermore, we highlight that the techniques we develop in the process should also yield improved bounds on the keyrates of decoy-state protocols even in the asymptotic limit.

Decoy state methods improve the feasibility of quantum key distribution (QKD) by enabling the use of simple, robust sources, and techniques have been developed to allow for the use of decoy analysis in the regime where only a finite number of signals are sent. We present an iid security proof for finite-size key rates of prepare-and-measure protocols with probabilistic testing, including decoy state methods, within a composable security framework that allows for future extensions to device imperfections. Additionally, we improve the acceptance set over previous works through the use of entrywise constraints, allowing us to efficiently perform decoy state protocols. Moreover, we introduce a new figure of merit, the expected key rate, to capture the tradeoff between aborting too often and achieving high key rates, which allows for increased practicality of QKD implementations.