Amir Arqand

Variational techniques have been recently developed to find tighter bounds on the von Neumann entropy in a completely device-independent (DI) setting. This, in turn, has led to significantly improved key rates of DI protocols, in both the asymptotic limit as well as in the finite-size regime. In this work, we derive novel variational expressions for Petz-Rényi divergences instead. We also derive two critical applications of this result. First, we show how these variational expressions can be used to further improve the finite-size key rate of DI protocols, by developing a fully-Rényi entropy accumulation theorem that can utilize these expressions for key rate computations. Second, we derive a security condition for DI advantage distillation that is based on the pretty good fidelity. We implement these techniques to derive increased noise tolerances for DIQKD protocols, which surpass the previously known bounds.

We derive a novel chain rule for a family of channel conditional entropies, covering von Neumann and sandwiched R\'{e}nyi entropies. In the process, we show that these channel conditional entropies are equal to their regularized version, and more generally, additive across tensor products of channels. For the purposes of cryptography, applying our chain rule to sequences of channels yields a new variant of R\'{e}nyi entropy accumulation, in which we can impose some specific forms of marginal-state constraint on the input states to each individual channel. This generalizes a recently introduced security proof technique that was developed to analyze prepare-and-measure QKD with no limitations on the repetition rate. In particular, our generalization yields ``fully adaptive'' protocols that can in principle update the entropy estimation procedure during the protocol itself, similar to the quantum probability estimation framework.

In this work we derive a number of chain rules for mutual information quantities, suitable for analyzing quantum cryptography with imperfect devices that leak additional information to an adversary. First, we derive a chain rule between smooth min-entropy and smooth max-information, which improves over previous chain rules for characterizing one-shot information leakage caused by an additional conditioning register. Second, we derive an information accumulation theorem that bounds the Rényi mutual information of a state produced by a sequence of channels, in terms of the Rényi mutual information of the individual channel outputs. In particular, this yields simple bounds on the smooth max-information in the preceding chain rule. Third, we derive chain rules between Rényi entropies and Rényi mutual information, which can be used to modify the entropy accumulation theorem to accommodate leakage registers sent to the adversary in each round of a protocol. We show that these results can be used to handle some device imperfections in a variety of device-dependent and device-independent protocols, such as randomness generation and quantum key distribution.

The entropy accumulation theorem, and its subsequent generalized version, is a powerful tool in the security analysis of many device-dependent and device-independent cryptography protocols. However, it has the drawback that the finite-size bounds it yields are not necessarily optimal, and furthermore it relies on the construction of an affine min-tradeoff function, which can often be challenging to construct optimally in practice. In this work, we address both of these challenges simultaneously by deriving a new entropy accumulation bound. Our bound yields significantly better finite-size performance, and can be computed as an intuitively interpretable convex optimization, without any specification of affine min-tradeoff functions. Furthermore, it can be applied directly at the level of Renyi entropies if desired, yielding fully-Renyi security proofs. Our proof techniques are based on elaborating on a connection between entropy accumulation and the frameworks of quantum probability estimation or f-weighted Rényi entropies, and in the process we obtain some new results with respect to those frameworks as well.

An important goal in quantum key distribution (QKD) is the task of providing a finite-size security proof without the assumption of collective attacks. For prepare-and-measure QKD, one approach for obtaining such proofs is the generalized entropy accumulation theorem (GEAT), but thus far it has only been applied to study a small selection of protocols. In this work, we present techniques for applying the GEAT in finite-size analysis of generic prepare-and-measure protocols, with a focus on decoy-state protocols. In particular, we present an improved approach for computing entropy bounds for decoy-state protocols, which has the dual benefits of providing tighter bounds than previous approaches (even asymptotically) and being compatible with methods for computing min-tradeoff functions in the GEAT. Furthermore, we develop methods to incorporate some improvements to the finite-size terms in the GEAT, and implement techniques to automatically optimize the min-tradeoff function. Our approach also addresses some numerical stability challenges specific to prepare-and-measure protocols, which were not addressed in previous works.

The entropy accumulation theorem, and its subsequent generalized version, is a powerful tool in the security analysis of many device-dependent and device-independent cryptography protocols. However, it has the drawback that the finite-size bounds it yields are not necessarily optimal, and furthermore, it relies on the construction of an affine min-tradeoff function, which in practice can often be challenging to construct optimally. In this work, we address both of these challenges simultaneously by deriving a new entropy-accumulation bound. Our bound yields significantly better finite-size performance, and can be computed as a convex optimization without any specification of affine min-tradeoff functions. Furthermore, it can be applied directly at the level of Rényi entropies if desired, yielding fully-Rényi security proofs. Our proof techniques are based on elaborating on a connection between entropy accumulation and the framework of quantum probability estimation, and in the process we obtain some new results with respect to the latter framework as well.

An important goal in quantum key distribution (QKD) is the task of providing a finite-size security proof without assuming that the states across the protocol rounds are independent and identically distributed (IID). For prepare-and-measure QKD, one recently developed approach for obtaining such proofs is the generalized entropy accumulation theorem (GEAT), but thus far it has only been applied to study a small selection of protocols. In this work, we present techniques for applying the GEAT in finite-size analysis of generic prepare-and-measure protocols, incorporating several methods to optimize the min-tradeoff function and minimize the second-order term in the GEAT. As a particular focus, we analyze decoy-state protocols and present a method for generically obtaining min-tradeoff functions for such protocols, even those where a closed-form expression for the asymptotic rate is not known. Furthermore, we highlight that the techniques we develop in the process should also yield improved bounds on the keyrates of decoy-state protocols even in the asymptotic limit.