Yuming Zhao

Compiling Bell games under cryptographic assumptions replaces the need for physical separation, allowing nonlocality to be probed with a single untrusted device. While Kalai et al. (STOC'23) showed that this compilation preserves quantum advantages, its quantitative quantum soundness has remained an open problem. We address this gap with two primary contributions. First, we establish the first quantitative quantum soundness bounds for every bipartite compiled Bell game whose optimal quantum strategy is finite-dimensional: any polynomial-time prover's score in the compiled game is negligibly close to the game's ideal quantum value. More generally, for all bipartite games we show that the compiled score cannot significantly exceed the bounds given by a newly formalized convergent sequential Navascués-Pironio-Acín (NPA) hierarchy. Second, we provide a full characterization of this sequential NPA hierarchy, establishing it as a robust numerical tool that is of independent interest. Finally, for games without finite-dimensional optimal strategies, we explore the necessity of NPA approximation error for quantitatively bounding their compiled scores, linking these considerations to the complexity conjecture $\mathrm{MIP}^{\mathrm{co}}=\mathrm{coRE}$ and open challenges such as quantum homomorphic encryption correctness for "weakly commuting" quantum registers.

We show that it is undecidable to determine whether the commuting operator value of a nonlocal game is strictly greater than 1/2. As a corollary, there is a boolean constraint system (BCS) nonlocal game for which the value of the Navascués, Pironio, and Acín (NPA) hierarchy does not attain the commuting operator value at any finite level. Our contribution involves establishing a computable mapping from Turing machines to BCS nonlocal games in which the halting property of the machine is encoded as a decision problem for the commuting operator value of the game. Our techniques are algebraic and distinct from those used to establish MIP*=RE. As a first step, we construct a mapping from Turing machines to elements of the tensor product of free algebras, showing that deciding positivity of those elements is coRE-hard. As a second step, we extend this mapping to further realize these elements as game polynomials for BCS games.

Proving the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols against arbitrary attacks is a challenging task for arbitrary protocols. Here, we accomplish this task by extending and improving both the decoy-state analysis against collective attacks, and the postselection technique to uplift this security proof to arbitrary attacks. First, we improve the postselection technique - both by improving the cost paid for the uplift, and by rigorously showing how it can be applied to generic optical protocols. Second, we fundamentally improve the decoy-state analysis in such a way that we require only one decoy intensity to achieve the same performance as prior analysis with two decoy intensities. This has two consequences - it makes the protocol easier to practically implement, and reduces the penalty incurred by using the postselection technique. Third, we extend the finite-size QKD analysis to decoy-state protocols and generically improve the finite-size correction terms that appear. Thus, we provide a full security proof against arbitrary attacks for generic decoy-state protocols.

Given that reliable cloud quantum computers are becoming closer to reality, the concept of delegation of quantum computations and its verifiability is of central interest. Many models have been proposed, each with specific strengths and weaknesses. Here, we put forth a new model where the client trusts only its classical processing, makes no computational assumptions, and interacts with a quantum server in a single round. In addition, during a set-up phase, the client specifies the size n of the computation and receives an untrusted, off-the-shelf (OTS) quantum device that is used to report the outcome of a single measurement. We show how to delegate polynomial-time quantum computations in the OTS model. This also yields an interactive proof system for all of QMA, which, furthermore, we show can be accomplished in statistical zero-knowledge. This provides the first relativistic (one-round), two-prover zero-knowledge proof system for QMA. As a proof approach, we provide a new self-test for n EPR pairs using only constant-sized Pauli measurements, and show how it provides a new avenue for the use of simulatable codes for local Hamiltonian verification. Along the way, we also provide an enhanced version of a well-known stability result due to Gowers and Hatami and show how it completes a common argument used in self-testing.

Given that reliable cloud quantum computers are becoming closer to reality, the concept of delegation of quantum computations and its verifiability is of central interest. Many models have been proposed, each with specific strengths and weaknesses. Here, we put forth a new model where the client trusts only its classical processing, makes no computational assumptions, and interacts with a quantum server in a \emph{single} round. In addition, during a set-up phase, the client specifies the size $n$ of the computation and receives an untrusted, \emph{off-the-shelf (OTS)} quantum device that is used to report the outcome of a single constant-sized measurement from a predetermined logarithmic-sized input. In the OTS model, we thus picture that a single quantum server does the bulk of the computations, while the OTS device is used as an untrusted and generic verification device, all in a single round. We show how to delegate polynomial-time quantum computations in the OTS model. Scaling up the technique also yields an interactive proof system for all of QMA, which, furthermore, we show can be accomplished in statistical zero-knowledge. This yields the first relativistic (one-round), two-prover zero-knowledge proof system for QMA. As a proof approach, we provide a new self-test for $n$-EPR pairs using only constant-sized Pauli measurements, and show how it provides a new avenue for the use of simulatable codes for local Hamiltonian verification. Along the way, we also provide an enhanced version of a well-known stability result due to Gowers and Hatami and show how it completes a common argument used in self-testing.

The postselection technique is a widely used tool to lift the security of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols against IID collective attacks to coherent attacks. While various other approaches for proving security against coherent attacks exist, they have limitations that make them less suitable for typical optical prepare-and-measure protocols. We identify and address some limitations of the postselection technique as applied to optical prepare-and-measure QKD protocols. We extend this analysis to decoy-state protocols, which are essential for long-distance QKD. Finally, we also improve the practical applicability of the postselection technique. Thus, we argue that the postselection technique, with the relevant modifications, is the only lift to coherent attacks that can be broadly applied to optical implementations of generic prepare-and-measure QKD protocols.