Martin Stierle

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises unprecedented security based on the principles of quantum mechanics. However, practical implementations of QKD systems are susceptible to various side-channel and implementation attacks that can compromise their security. We presents a comprehensive overview of the literature on side channels and implementation attacks on QKD systems, a systematic categorization of different attack vectors and proposed counter measures and analysis of their impact on security. Furthermore, we propose a structured approach for developing standardized tests to evaluate the robustness of QKD systems against these vulnerabilities. Our work aims to bridge the gap between theoretical security and practical implementation, providing a roadmap for future certification of QKD products to be deployed within the European Quantum Communication Infrastructure (EuroQCI).

The transition of Quantum Technologies (QT) being no longer pure basic research but touching applied fields with emerging products is companied by requests for standardization and certification. The call of the markets requesting products based on QT will require alignment of QT products to match not only the need for standards but also the proof to fulfil certification procedures. We will isolate and identify the most promising candidates for this endeavour and by listing challenges, obstacles and dependencies we will propose a strategy and envision a standardization roadmap