24
collaborators
2020–2025
years active
Contributions
QIP QCrypt TQC talk poster presenter award · △program ◇steering ○organizing · filled = chair
4 Posters
| Title | Conference | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|
| Enabling high-speed quantum random number generation by optically injection-locking a pulsed laser | QCRYPT 2025 | Anastasiya Ponosova, Dmitry Shkrabin, Maxim Fadeev, Vadim Makarov, Roman Shakhovoy |
Our study shows that the rate of random number generation by QRNG based on interference of laser pulses is significantly more limited than expected. An increase in generation speed requires shortening the duration of laser pulses. However, the interference of short laser pulses from a single laser diode is problematic due to jitter and phase modulation (chirp). The optically injection-locked configuration proposed by L. C. Comandar for MDI QKD does not have the above disadvantages and therefore enables the design of QRNG with a high speed of random number generation. |
||
| Certification of a commercial quantum key distribution system against implementation loopholes | QCRYPT 2024 | Vadim Makarov, Alexey Abrikosov, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Aleksey Fedorov, Anqi Huang, Evgeny Kiktenko, Mikhail Petrov, Anastasiya Ponosova, Andrey Tayduganov, Daniil Trefilov, Konstantin Zaitsev |
We report recent advances in the development of certification for quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. We give an example of a commercial QKD system that we have analysed for possible loopholes, improved to close the vulnerabilities identified, and designed a set of tests for that can be used by a certification lab [arXiv:2310.20107]. We explain some of the testbenches in this lab, such as an ultrawide spectral characterisation testbench, automated detector testing, and laser damage testbench that verifies the quality of a power limiter. This work is in line with the requirements of the ISO standard for QKD and paves the way for the creation of certification services. |
||
| Creation of loopholes in QKD systems using high-power pulsed laser | QCRYPT 2022 | Irina Zhluktova, Mikhail Petrov, Konstantin Zaitsev, Polina Acheva, Nikolay Zunikov, Alexey Shilko, Djeylan Aktas, Daniil Trefilov, Anastasiya Ponosova, Vladimir Kamynin, Vadim Makarov |
| Protecting QKD sources against light-injection attacks | QCRYPT 2020 | Anastasiya Ponosova, Friederike Johlinger, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Vladimir Egorov, Djeylan Aktas, John Rarity, Christopher Erven, Vadim Makarov, Anqi Huang |
In the age of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI QKD) and twin- field QKD (TF QKD), the source units of these QKD schemes may become a new ``Achilles' heel" of the whole system. An adversary, Eve, can conduct various attacks on the sources by injecting lasers, whose power is limited by the laser-induced damage threshold of the quantum channel. Such an amount of power may modify the characteristics of components in a source. In this work, we study possible components to protect the source from the light-injected attacks, i.e., Trojan-horse attack, the laser-seeding attack, and the laser-damage attack. Experimental testing shows that fiber-optics isolators and circulators are good passive countermeasures because they sacrifice themselves' isolation under a high-power laser to protect other components behind them. Moreover, we find that illuminated by the high-power laser, integrated photonics QKD chips only lose the transmission of the coupler before any other change happens for the other components in the chips. |
||
Collaborators
| Co-author | Joint talks |
|---|---|
| Anastasiya Ponosova | 4 |
| Vadim Makarov | 4 |
| Anqi Huang | 2 |
| Daniil Trefilov | 2 |
| Djeylan Aktas | 2 |
| Konstantin Zaitsev | 2 |
| Mikhail Petrov | 2 |
| Poompong Chaiwongkhot | 2 |
| Aleksey Fedorov | 1 |
| Alexey Abrikosov | 1 |
| Alexey Shilko | 1 |
| Andrey Tayduganov | 1 |
| Christopher Erven | 1 |
| Dmitry Shkrabin | 1 |
| Evgeny Kiktenko | 1 |
| Friederike Johlinger | 1 |
| Irina Zhluktova | 1 |
| John Rarity | 1 |
| Maxim Fadeev | 1 |
| Nikolay Zunikov | 1 |