0
talks
4
posters
0
committee roles
0
leadership roles
2024–2025
years active
Posters
| Title | Conference | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|
| Overview of recent results on the optical-pumping attack on quantum key distribution sources | QCRYPT 2025 | Maxim Fadeev, Irina Zhluktova, Serafima Filatova, Vladimir Kamynin, Anatoliy Sotnikov, Roman Shakhovoy, Vladimir Tsvetkov, Vadim Makarov |
In this work, we demonstrate a new kind of attack on laser sources in quantum key distribution systems - the optical-pumping attack. We investigated its influence on a single distributed feedback laser diode and an optically injection-locked source configuration. The spectral dependency of this attack was also examined. We managed to increase the energy of emitted pulses using attackers light at several wavelengths. The developed optical-pumping attack should be considered as a possible threat to the security of QKD systems because the increase of pulse energy leads to overestimation of secret key rate between Alice and Bob, giving more information about secret key to Eve. |
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| Enabling high-speed quantum random number generation by optically injection-locking a pulsed laser | QCRYPT 2025 | Dmitry Shkrabin, Daria Ruzhitskaya, Maxim Fadeev, Vadim Makarov, Roman Shakhovoy |
Our study shows that the rate of random number generation by QRNG based on interference of laser pulses is significantly more limited than expected. An increase in generation speed requires shortening the duration of laser pulses. However, the interference of short laser pulses from a single laser diode is problematic due to jitter and phase modulation (chirp). The optically injection-locked configuration proposed by L.
C. Comandar for MDI QKD does not have the above disadvantages and therefore enables
the design of QRNG with a high speed of random number generation. |
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| Certification of a commercial quantum key distribution system against implementation loopholes | QCRYPT 2024 | Vadim Makarov, Alexey Abrikosov, Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Aleksey Fedorov, Anqi Huang, Evgeny Kiktenko, Mikhail Petrov, Daria Ruzhitskaya, Andrey Tayduganov, Daniil Trefilov, Konstantin Zaitsev |
We report recent advances in the development of certification for quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. We give an example of a commercial QKD system that we have analysed for possible loopholes, improved to close the vulnerabilities identified, and designed a set of tests for that can be used by a certification lab [arXiv:2310.20107]. We explain some of the testbenches in this lab, such as an ultrawide spectral characterisation testbench, automated detector testing, and laser damage testbench that verifies the quality of a power limiter. This work is in line with the requirements of the ISO standard for QKD and paves the way for the creation of certification services. |
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| Optical fuse for protection of QKD transmitters against light-injection attacks | QCRYPT 2024 | Ekaterina Borisova, Boris Galagan, Vasiliy Koltashev, Natalia Arutyunyan, Elena Obraztsova, Alexey Shilko, Vadim Makarov |
We propose an original device that can protect quantum key distribution (QKD) systems from the effects of intense laser radiation. Carbon nanomaterials dispersed in a polymer can be used as a fuse that interrupts key distribution when Eve tries to hack the system by high-power laser emission. Moreover, it saves system components from laser damage. |
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Collaborators
| Co-author | Joint talks |
|---|---|
| Vadim Makarov | 4 |
| Daria Ruzhitskaya | 2 |
| Maxim Fadeev | 2 |
| Roman Shakhovoy | 2 |
| Aleksey Fedorov | 1 |
| Alexey Abrikosov | 1 |
| Alexey Shilko | 1 |
| Anatoliy Sotnikov | 1 |
| Andrey Tayduganov | 1 |
| Anqi Huang | 1 |
| Boris Galagan | 1 |
| Daniil Trefilov | 1 |
| Dmitry Shkrabin | 1 |
| Ekaterina Borisova | 1 |
| Elena Obraztsova | 1 |
| Evgeny Kiktenko | 1 |
| Irina Zhluktova | 1 |
| Konstantin Zaitsev | 1 |
| Mikhail Petrov | 1 |
| Natalia Arutyunyan | 1 |