Boris Škorić

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is currently being discussed as a technology to safeguard communication in a future where quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems. We conduct a comprehensive security evaluation of QKD-based solutions, focusing on real-world use cases sourced from academic literature and industry reports. We analyze these use cases, assess their security, and identify the possible advantages of deploying QKD-based solutions. We further compare QKD-based solutions with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), the alternative approach to achieving security when quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems, evaluating their respective suitability for each scenario. Based on this comparative analysis, we critically discuss and comment on which use cases QKD is suited for, considering factors such as implementation complexity, scalability, and long-term security. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the role QKD could play in future cryptographic infrastructures and offer guidance to decision-makers considering the deployment of QKD.

Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution (CVQKD) at large distances has such high noise levels that the employed error-correcting codes must have very low rate. In this regime it becomes feasible to implement random-codebook error correction, which is known to perform close to capacity.

Motivated by the fact that coherent states may offer practical advantages it was recently shown that a continuous-variable (CV) quantum position verification (QPV) protocol using coherent states could be securely implemented if and only if attackers do not pre-share any entanglement. In the discrete-variable (DV) analogue of that protocol it was shown that modifying how the classical input information is sent from the verifiers to the prover leads to a favourable scaling in the resource requirements for a quantum attack. In this work, we show that similar conclusions can be drawn for CV-QPV. By adding extra classical information of size $n$ to a CV-QPV protocol, we show that the protocol, which uses a coherent state and classical information, remains secure, even if the quantum information travels arbitrarily slow, against attackers who pre-share CV (entangled) states with a linear (in $n$) cutoff at the photon number. We show that the protocol remains secure for certain attenuation and excess noise.

A multidimensional optimisation analysis for CV-QKD systems with practical constraints is presented. We demonstrate secret-key-rates >1Mb/s for 30km transmission with arbitrary discrete modulation, utilising 10dB receiver clearance and 100kHz summedlinewidth as a cost-effective implementation.