Martin Sandfuchs

We consider a pair of causally independent processes, modelled as the tensor product of two channels, acting on a possibly correlated input to produce random outputs X and Y. We show that, assuming the processes produce a sufficient amount of randomness, one can extract uniform randomness from X and Y. This generalizes prior results, which assumed that X and Y are (conditionally) independent. Note that in contrast to the independence of quantum states, the independence of channels can be enforced through spacelike separation. As a consequence, our results allow for the generation of randomness under more practical and physically justifiable assumptions than previously possible. We illustrate this with the example of device-independent randomness amplification, where we can remove the constraint that the adversary only has access to classical side information about the source.

The design of quantum protocols for secure key generation poses many challenges: On the one hand, they need to be practical concerning experimental realisations. On the other hand, their theoretical description must be simple enough to allow for a security proof against all possible attacks. Often, these two requirements are in conflict with each other, and the differential phase shift (DPS) QKD protocol exemplifies these difficulties: It is designed to be implementable with current optical telecommunication technology, which, for this protocol, comes at the cost that many standard security proof techniques do not apply to it. After about 20 years since its invention, this work presents the first full security proof of DPS QKD against general attacks, including finite-size effects. The proof combines techniques from quantum information theory, quantum optics, and relativity. We first give a security proof of a QKD protocol whose security stems from relativistic constraints. We then show that security of DPS QKD can be reduced to security of the relativistic protocol. In addition, we show that coherent attacks on the DPS protocol are, in fact, stronger than collective attacks.

The design of quantum protocols for secure key generation poses many challenges: On the one hand, they need to be practical concerning experimental realisations. On the other hand, their theoretical description must be simple enough to allow for a security proof against all possible attacks. Often, these two requirements are in conflict with each other, and the differential phase shift (DPS) QKD protocol exemplifies these difficulties: It is designed to be implementable with current optical telecommunication technology, which, for this protocol, comes at the cost that many standard security proof techniques do not apply to it. After about 20 years since its invention, this work presents the first full security proof of DPS QKD against general attacks, including finite-size effects. The proof combines techniques from quantum information theory, quantum optics, and relativity. We first give a security proof of a QKD protocol whose security stems from relativistic constraints. We then show that security of DPS QKD can be reduced to security of the relativistic protocol. In addition, we show that coherent attacks on the DPS protocol are, in fact, stronger than collective attacks.

We consider a pair of causally independent processes, modelled as the tensor product of two channels, acting on a possibly correlated input to produce random outputs X and Y. We show that, assuming the processes produce a sufficient amount of randomness, one can extract uniform randomness from X and Y. This generalizes prior results, which assumed that X and Y are (conditionally) independent. Note that in contrast to the independence of quantum states, the independence of channels can be enforced through spacelike separation. As a consequence, our results allow for the generation of randomness under more practical and physically justifiable assumptions than previously possible. We illustrate this with the example of device-independent randomness amplification, where we can remove the constraint that the adversary only has access to classical side information about the source.