0
talks
2
posters
0
committee roles
0
leadership roles
2025–2025
years active
Posters
| Title | Conference | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|
| Qubit-Based Synchronization Algorithm for Measurement-DeviceIndependent Quantum Key Distribution | QCRYPT 2025 | Zhengkai Huang, Jiaxuan Li, Fengyu Lu, Zehao Wang, Shuang Wang, Zhenqiang Yin, Wei Chen, Guangcan Guo, Zhengfu Han |
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is considered one of the most promising protocols due to its high performance and security. To implement the MDI-QKD system in practice, clock synchronization is a crucial step to correctly generate the secret keys. However, as practical applications advance, the complexity and cost of synchronization have become significant challenges for the implementation of MDI-QKD. In this study, we introduce a qubit-based synchronization algorithm specifically designed for MDI-QKD. By utilizing the property of Hong-Ou-Mandel interference, we achieve clock synchronization between parties of MDI-QKD without the need for additional hardware. The cost-effectiveness and simplicity of this approach are expected to significantly facilitate the practical deployment of MDI-QKD. |
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| Muted attack on a high-speed quantum key distribution system | QCRYPT 2025 | Jialei Su, Jialin Chen, Fengyu Lu, Zihao Chen, Junxuan Liu, Shuang Wang, Anqi Huang |
High-speed quantum key distribution (QKD) systems have achieved repetition frequencies above gigahertz through advanced technologies and devices, laying an important foundation for the deployment of high-key-rate QKD system. However, these advancements may introduce unknown security loopholes into the QKD system. For an eavesdropper Eve, it is challenging to exploit these security loopholes performing the intercept-and-resend attacks due to the limited time window under the high repetition frequency. Here, we propose a muted attack that does not require intercept-and-resend operation, which is applicable to high-speed QKD systems. By exploiting the security loophole of the width discriminator on the single photon avalanche detector (SPAD), Eve can control whether Bob’s detector is capable of receiving photons from Alice, allowing her to learn nearly all the keys. Additionally, we verified through experimental tests that Eve only needs to match the period of the hacking pulse with the dead time of the SPAD and ensure that each pulse contains hundreds of photons. This study reveals the security loopholes introduced by the state-of-the-art devices in high-speed QKD systems. |
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Collaborators
| Co-author | Joint talks |
|---|---|
| Fengyu Lu | 2 |
| Shuang Wang | 2 |
| Anqi Huang | 1 |
| Guangcan Guo | 1 |
| Jialei Su | 1 |
| Jialin Chen | 1 |
| Jiaxuan Li | 1 |
| Junxuan Liu | 1 |
| Wei Chen | 1 |
| Zehao Wang | 1 |
| Zhengfu Han | 1 |
| Zhengkai Huang | 1 |
| Zhenqiang Yin | 1 |
| Zihao Chen | 1 |