Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo

The performance of quantum key distribution (QKD) is severely limited by multiphoton emissions, due to the photon-number-splitting attack. The most efficient solution, the decoy-state method, requires that the phases of all transmitted pulses are independent and uniformly random. In practice, however, these phases are often correlated, especially in high-speed systems, which opens a security loophole. Here, we address this pressing problem by providing a security proof for decoy-state QKD with correlated phases that offers key rates close to the ideal scenario. Our work paves the way towards high-performance secure QKD with practical laser sources, and may have applications beyond QKD.

Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) is undoubtedly the most efficient solution to handle multi-photon signals emitted by laser sources, and provides the same secret key rate scaling as ideal single-photon sources. It requires, however, that the phase of each emitted pulse is uniformly random. This might be difficult to guarantee in practice, due to inevitable device imperfections and/or the use of an external phase modulator for phase randomization, which limits the possible selected phases to a finite set. Here, we investigate the security of decoy-state QKD with arbitrary, continuous or discrete, non-uniform phase randomization, and show that this technique is quite robust to deviations from the ideal uniformly random scenario. For this, we combine a novel parameter estimation technique based on semi-definite programming, with the use of basis mismatched events, to tightly estimate the parameters that determine the achievable secret key rate. In doing so, we demonstrate that our analysis can significantly outperform previous results that address more restricted scenarios.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information-theoretic security based on quantum mechanics, but practical implementations face security vulnerabilities due to device imperfections. While recent advances have separately addressed source and detector imperfections, real-world QKD systems suffer from both simultaneously. Here, we demonstrate that existing phase-error-estimation-based security proof techniques can be integrated into a unified security proof that simultaneously accounts for both types of imperfections. This represents an important step toward closing the gap between theoretical security proofs and practical QKD implementations.

Numerical security proofs offer a versatile approach for evaluating the secret-key generation rate of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. However, existing methods typically require perfect source characterization, which is unrealistic in practice due to the presence of inevitable encoding imperfections and side channels. In this paper, we introduce a novel security proof technique based on semidefinite programming that can evaluate the secret-key rate for both prepare-and-measure and measurement-device-independent QKD protocols when only partial information about the emitted states is available, significantly improving the applicability and practical relevance compared to existing numerical techniques. We demonstrate that our method can outperform current analytical approaches addressing partial state characterization in terms of achievable secret-key rates, particularly for protocols with non-qubit encoding spaces. This represents a significant step towards bridging the gap between theoretical security proofs and practical QKD implementations.

Bandwidth-limited devices in the transmitter of fast QKD implementations cause pulse correlations that leak information about previous setting choices. To take them into account in the existing security proofs, a measure of their strengths is needed. This is experimentally challenging, especially for long-range correlations, which are not experimentally accessible. In this work, we propose a new characterization method that exploits a linear model of the modulation devices. We show that this model predicts an upper bound for arbitrary order correlations that makes their characterization possible. We also present experimental results using the proposed method. In doing so, we can retrieve security even in the presence of arbitrary long correlations, with similar performance to classical security proofs.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols leverage quantum mechanics to achieve information theoretically secure communication, yet real-world implementations must address experimental limitations, particularly phase correlations in weak coherent laser pulses (WCPs). High-speed gain-switching lasers, commonly used in QKD, can exhibit residual photons causing phase correlations between consecutive pulses, challenging the perfect phase randomization assumption crucial for the decoy-state BB84 protocol. Theoretical work has proposed security proofs that require knowledge of how closely each phase's probability distribution approximates uniformity, which is complex to estimate experimentally. In this study we introduce an experimental method to characterise phase correlations of any length under realistic conditions by modelling the phase generation process within the laser cavity. Additionally, we experimentally benchmark this practical routine for measuring second-order correlations using a double Michelson interferometer with tunable amplitude attenuators, allowing comprehensive characterisation of the phase generation process and accurate measurement of the phase probability distribution, thus enhancing the security of QKD systems.

A crucial assumption in most quantum key distribution (QKD) security proofs, is that no information about the selected settings is leaked to the channel. A secure space around the users' devices is usually required to ensure both parties can generate and handle classical data securely. However, this condition is not feasible in practice, since the devices usually leak some information passively, and an eavesdropper could even run a Trojan horse attack (THA) by injecting bright light into the QKD apparatuses, causing an active leak of information. In this paper, we present the first security proof for a decoy state protocol that considers an arbitrary leakage from every setting selected in the source due to passive or active information leakage. Furthermore, we apply our security proof to various cases of practical interest and we analyze the effectiveness of placing an extra phase modulator in the source to improve the secret key rate. Our analysis is also experimentally friendly, as it only requires one parameter to encapsulates all side-channel imperfections. We believe that our results constitute a vital step in closing the existing gap between theory and implementation in QKD.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises theoretically unbreakable encryption by exploiting the principles of quantum mechanics. However, the security of real-world implementations is compromised by inevitable device imperfections, unless these are accounted for in the security proof. In this work, we introduce an innovative and powerful security proof framework that guarantees robustness against all practical source imperfections while maintaining high performances, thereby significantly bridging the gap between the theoretical promise and practical realization of QKD. In combination with measurement-device-independent QKD, which closes all security loopholes related to the measurement units, our framework can guarantee an unprecedented level of implementation security.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) has raised as an attractive alternative to classical cryptography due to its security being provided by quantum mechanics rather than relying on algorithms that could potentially be broken in the future, rendering current communications insecure. However, many of the security proofs rely on assumptions that may not agree with reality, for instance, device imperfections can open loopholes that could potentially be exploited by a malicious party in order to extract part, if not all, of the secret key.

Typical security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) require that the emitted signals are independent and identically distributed. In practice, however, this assumption is not met because intrinsic device flaws inevitably introduce correlations between the emitted signals. Although analyses addressing this issue have been recently proposed, they only consider a restrictive scenario in which the correlations have a finite and known maximum length that is much smaller than the total number of emitted signals. While it is expected that the magnitude of the correlations decreases as the pulse separation increases, the assumption that this magnitude is exactly zero after a certain point does not seem to have any physical justification. Concerningly, this means that existing analyses cannot guarantee the security of current QKD implementations. Here, we solve this pressing problem by developing a general framework that can handle pulse correlations of unbounded length. Our framework allows us to directly use existing proofs addressing this imperfection without the need to construct them from scratch, thus reestablishing the security of QKD in a simple and versatile manner.

Decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) represents nowadays the best countermeasure to attacks exploiting multi-photon emissions in realistic sources. A fundamental requirement is the uniform and independent distribution of phases of the transmitted pulses. However, this can not be true for lasers working under high-speed gain-switching conditions, as residual photons in the cavity can induce phase correlations across consecutive pulses. A security proof robust against such imperfections has been recently proposed, which requires knowledge of a parameter that quantifies how close the conditional distribution of each phase is to a uniform distribution. In this work we propose an experimental method to characterise this parameter in realistic setup conditions and we extend the application to the case of arbitrary length of correlations, aiming to enable experimental verification of the implementation security.