Prabhanjan Ananth

Classical non-interactive secure computation, despite being extensive studied, suffers from an inherent barrier: adversaries can learn the entire residual function via resetting attacks. We investigate whether quantum resources can circumvent this barrier and restrict adversarial leakage. Our results are as follows: 1. Definitions: We introduce new security definitions for the one-message MPC and 2PC settings that restrict the amount of adversarial leakage compared to prior classical definitions. 2. MPC: There exist information-theoretically secure one-message multi-party computation protocols in the oracle model in both the quantum pre-processing and classical pre-processing settings. 3. 2PC: There exist semi-honest secure one-message two-party computation for (randomized) pseudorandom functionalities in the plain model based on LWE and maliciously secure one-message two-party computation for (randomized) constrained functionalities in the CRS model based on iO. Prior work by [Gupte, Liu, Raizes, Roberts and, Vaikuntanathan STOC 2025] achieved semi-honest security based on iO. Our results demonstrate the power of quantum information to circumvent barriers in classical secure computation.

Gluing theorem for random unitaries [Schuster, Haferkamp, Huang, QIP 2025] have found numerous applications, including designing low depth random unitaries [Schuster, Haferkamp, Huang, QIP 2025], random unitaries in QAC0 [Foxman, Parham, Vasconcelos, Yuen'25] and generically shortening the key length of pseudorandom unitaries [Ananth, Bostanci, Gulati, Lin EUROCRYPT'25]. We present an alternate method of combining Haar random unitaries from the gluing lemma from [Schuster, Haferkamp, Huang, QIP 2025] that is secure against adversaries with inverse query access to the joined unitary. As a consequence, we show for the first time that strong pseudorandom unitaries can generically have their length extended, and can be constructed using only O(n^(1/c)) bits of randomness, for any constant c, if strong pseudorandom unitaries exists.

Quantum cryptographic definitions are often sensitive to the number of copies of the cryptographic states received by adversary. Making definitional changes to the number of copies accessible to an adversary can drastically affect various aspects including the computational hardness, feasibility, and applicability of the resulting cryptographic scheme. This phenomenon appears in many places in quantum cryptography, including the notions quantum pseudorandomness and unclonable cryptography. To address this, we present a generic approach to boost single-copy security to multi-copy security and apply this approach to many settings. As a consequence, we obtain the following new results: • One-copy stretch pseudorandom state generators (under mild assumptions) imply the existence of t-copy stretch pseudorandom state generators, for any fixed polynomial t. • One-query pseudorandom unitaries with short keys (under mild assumptions) imply the existence of t-query pseudorandom unitaries with short keys, for any fixed polynomial t. • Assuming indistinguishability obfuscation and other standard cryptographic assumptions, there exist identical-copy secure unclonable primitives such as publickey quantum money and quantum copy-protection.

Common random string model is a popular model in classical cryptography with many constructions proposed in this model. We study a quantum analogue of this model called the common Haar state model, which was also studied in an independent work by Chen, Coladangelo and Sattath (arXiv 2024). In this model, every party in the cryptographic system receives many copies of one or more i.i.d Haar states. Our main result is the construction of a statistically secure pseudorandom function-like state generator (PRFSG) in the common Haar state model. Our construction satisfies stretch property (output length > $\lambda$), can handle inputs of length $\lambda^{c}$ and is secure as long as the adversary gets $O\left(\frac{\lambda^{1-c}}{(\log(\lambda))^{1.01}} \right)$ number of queries, where $\lambda$ is the length of the PRFSG key and $c \in [0,1)$. We show the optimality of our construction by proving a matching lower bound. As a consequence, for the first time, we show that (computationally secure) PRFSGs for super-logarithmic input length can be constructed from (computationally secure) pseudorandom state generators in some parameter regimes.

The powerful no-cloning principle of quantum mechanics can be leveraged to achieve interesting primitives, referred to as unclonable primitives, that are impossible to achieve classically. In the past few years, we have witnessed a surge of new unclonable primitives. While prior works have mainly focused on establishing feasibility results, another equally important direction, that of understanding the relationship between different unclonable primitives is still in its nascent stages. Moving forward, we need a more systematic study of unclonable primitives. To this end, we introduce a new framework called cloning games. This framework captures many fundamental unclonable primitives such as quantum money, copy-protection, unclonable encryption, single-decryptor encryption, and many more. By reasoning about different types of cloning games, we obtain many interesting implications to unclonable cryptography, including the following: 1) We obtain the first construction of information-theoretically secure single-decryptor encryption in the one-time setting. 2) We construct unclonable encryption in the quantum random oracle model based on BB84 states, improving upon the previous work, which used coset states. Our work also provides a simpler security proof for the previous work. 3) We construct copy-protection for single-bit point functions in the quantum random oracle model based on BB84 states, improving upon the previous work, which used coset states, and additionally, providing a simpler proof. 4) We establish a relationship between different challenge distributions of copy-protection schemes and single-decryptor encryption schemes. 5) Finally, we present a new construction of one-time encryption with certified deletion.

Abstract In quantum copy-protection, an adversary who is given a quantum state computing a function f cannot produce two (possibly entangled) quantum states that each individually compute f. No constructions for copy-protection are known in the plain model. We consider a weaker notion, secure software leasing (SSL), where it is only impossible to produce two copies that can both compute f using the honest evaluation algorithm. We show the following: (1) SSL is possible for a subclass of evasive functions, assuming the existence of post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscators and hardness of LWE; (2) SSL is impossible in general, assuming hardness of LWE. The second statement has important implications for existing quantum-cryptographic notions: in particular, it implies the impossibility of quantum copy-protection for arbitrary unlearnable functions, and impossibility of quantum virtual-black-box obfuscation of classical circuits.

We explore a new pathway to designing unclonable cryptographic primitives. We propose a new notion called unclonable puncturable obfuscation (UPO) and study its implications for unclonable cryptography. Using UPO, we present modular (and in some cases, arguably, simple) constructions of many primitives in unclonable cryptography, including, public-key quantum money, quantum copy-protection for many classes of functionalities, unclonable encryption, and single-decryption encryption.

Unclonable cryptography utilizes the principles of quantum mechanics to addresses cryptographic tasks that are impossible classically. We introduce a novel unclonable primitive in the context of secret sharing, called unclonable secret sharing (USS). In a USS scheme, there are n shareholders, each holding a share of a classical secret represented as a quantum state. They can recover the secret once all parties (or at least t parties) come together with their shares. Importantly, it should be infeasible to copy their own shares and send the copies to two non-communicating parties, enabling both of them to recover the secret.