Angeles Vazquez-Castro

Quantum communication is emerging as a foundational element of future secure information systems, with applications ranging from key distribution to direct message transmission. Widely used standards such as the Digital Video Broadcasting – Satellite – Second Generation Extension (DVB-S2X) can be considered for satellite-based quantum communication scenarios, where resource constraints and channel impairments must be carefully addressed. While much of the early work in quantum security focused on asymptotic analyses or relied on models rooted in classical wiretap theory, there is a growing need for frameworks that provide operational security guarantees in finite-length and non-asymptotic regimes. In this work, we address that gap by introducing a composable security metric based on the trace distance, derived from α-order Rényi information. Our model, illustrated in Fig. 1 (left), serves as a general abstraction of quantum communication systems subject to eavesdropping, which includes protocols of the family known as Quantum Direct Secure Communication (QDSC), which aim to transmit confidential messages directly over quantum channels. The proposed framework allows for precise evaluation of secrecy leakage under realistic conditions and offers an alternative to traditional key-based paradigms, thereby contributing to the broader effort of enabling keyless secure and efficient quantum communication. Our key result is a composable bound on the trace distance, which solely depends on an αparameterized mutual information term. Unlike conventional methods based on ε-smooth min-entropy, our approach avoids smoothing altogether while still ensuring composability. This leads to analytically tractable bounds and a clearer understanding of the trade-off between coding rate and secrecy. As a practical application, we apply our bounds to a one-way information flow where BPSK-modulated coherent quantum states carry secret information over lossy bosonic channels, consistent with DVB-S2X satellite links. Our results, illustrated in Fig. 1 (right) provide two-fold insights. First, we demonstrate the usefulness of our bound for practical design of reliable and secret space links. Second, we quantify the reliability-secrecy trade-off by numerically showing that the finitelength physical-layer secrecy can be guaranteed only if coding rates are appropriately adjusted.

We study information theoretical security for space links between a satellite and a ground-station. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a well established method for information theoretical secure communication, giving the eavesdropper unlimited access to the channel and technological resources only limited by the laws of quantum physics. But QKD for space links is extremely challenging, the achieved key rates are extremely low, and day-time operating impossible. However, eavesdropping on a channel in free-space without being noticed seems complicated, given the constraints imposed by orbital mechanics. If we also exclude eavesdropper's presence in a given area around the emitter and receiver, we can guarantee that he has only access to a fraction of the optical signal. In this setting, quantum keyless private (direct) communication based on the wiretap channel model is a valid alternative to provide information theoretical security. Like for QKD, we assume the legitimate users to be limited by state-of-the-art technology, while the potential eavesdropper is only limited by physical laws: either by specifying her detection strategy (Helstrom detector) or by bounding her knowledge, assuming the most powerful strategy through the Holevo information. Nevertheless, we demonstrate information theoretical secure communication rates (positive keyless private capacity) over a classical-quantum wiretap channel using on-o -keying of coherent states. We present numerical results for a setting equivalent to the recent experiments with the Micius satellite and compare them to the fundamental limit for the secret key rate of QKD. We obtain much higher rates compared with QKD with exclusion area of less than 13 meters for Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. Moreover, we show that the wiretap channel quantum keyless privacy is much less sensitive to noise and signal dynamics and daytime operation is possible.