32
collaborators
2020–2023
years active
Contributions
QIP QCrypt TQC talk poster presenter award · △program ◇steering ○organizing · filled = chair
3 Talks
| Title | Conference | Type | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|---|
| High-Rate Quantum Key Distribution exceeding 110Mb/s | QCRYPT 2023 | regular | Wei Li, Likang Zhang, Yichen Lu, Sheng-Kai Liao, Jia Huang, Hao Li, Zhen Wang, Hao-Kun Mao, Bingze Yan, Qiong Li, Yang Liu, Qiang Zhang, Cheng-Zhi Peng, Lixing You, Feihu Xu, Jianwei Pan |
We report a quantum key distribution system that is able to generate key at a record high key rate of 115.8 Mb/s over 10-km standard fibre. This attributes to a high-efficiency multi-pixel superconducting nanowire detector, a low-error integrated transmitter, and a fast post-processing algorithm. |
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High-rate quantum key distribution with silicon photonics
Best Student Paper Award (Experiment) — Likang Zhang
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QCRYPT 2021 | regular | Likang Zhang, Wei Li, Yan-Lin Tang, Kejin Wei, Sheng-Kai Liao, Cheng-Zhi Peng, Feihu Xu, Jian-Wei Pan |
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide information-theoretic security governed by the law of quantum physics. Toward real-life applications, secret key rate is a key figure of merit of the QKD system. Here we demonstrate a 2.5-GHz polarization-encoding QKD system with an integrated silicon photonic transmitter that is able to generate a secret key rate of 2.42±0.04 Mbps over 101-km standard telecom fibers (19.6-dB loss). Such high rate attributes to the high clock-rate transmission and the ultra-low quantum bit error rate of 0.49%. The scalability, miniaturization and stability offered by silicon photonic technologies along with high-key-rate performance indicate that our system is a promising solution for large-scale deployment of QKD. |
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| High-Speed Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution with Integrated Silicon Photonics | QCRYPT 2020 | regular | Wei Li, Kejin Wei, Yang Li, Hao Min, Wei-Jun Zhang, Hao Li, Lixing You, Zhen Wang, Xiao Jiang, Teng Yun Chen, Sheng-Kai Liao, Cheng-Zhi Peng, Feihu Xu, Jian-Wei Pan |
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) removes all detector side channels and enables secure QKD with an untrusted relay. It is suitable for building a star-type quantum access network, where the complicated and expensive measurement devices are placed in the central untrusted relay and each user requires only a low-cost transmitter, such as an integrated photonic chip. Here, we experimentally demonstrate a 1.25 GHz silicon photonic chip-based MDI-QKD system using polarization encoding. The photonic chip transmitters integrate the necessary encoding components for a standard QKD source. We implement random modulations of polarization states and decoy intensities, and demonstrate a finite-key secret rate of 31 bps over 36 dB channel loss (or 180 km standard fiber). This key rate is higher than state-of-the-art MDI-QKD experiments. The results show that silicon photonic chip-based MDI-QKD, benefiting from miniaturization, low-cost manufacture and compatibility with CMOS microelectronics, is a promising solution for future quantum secure networks. |
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2 Posters
| Title | Conference | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|
| Effect of light injection on the security of practical quantum key distribution | QCRYPT 2023 | Liying Han, Yang Li, Weiyang Zhang, Wenqi Cai, Juan Yin, Jigang Ren, Feihu Xu, Shengkai Liao, Chengzhi Peng |
Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics can allow the distribution of secure keys between distant users. However, the imperfections in realistic devices may lead to potential security risks, which must be accurately characterized and considered in practical security analysis. High-speed optical modulators, being as one of the core components of practical QKD systems, can be used to prepare the required quantum states. Here, we find that optical modulators based on LiNbO3, including phase modulators and intensity modulators, are vulnerable to photorefractive effect caused by external light injection. By changing the power of external light, eavesdroppers can control the intensities of the prepared states, posing a potential threat to the security of QKD. We have experimentally demonstrated the influence of light injection on LiNbO3-based optical modulators and analyzed the security risks caused by the potential green light injection attack, along with the corresponding countermeasures. |
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| External magnetic effect for the security of practical quantum key distribution | QCRYPT 2022 | Wei-Yang Zhang, Sheng-Kai Liao, Feihu Xu |
Collaborators
| Co-author | Joint talks |
|---|---|
| Feihu Xu | 5 |
| Sheng-Kai Liao | 4 |
| Cheng-Zhi Peng | 3 |
| Wei Li | 3 |
| Hao Li | 2 |
| Jian-Wei Pan | 2 |
| Kejin Wei | 2 |
| Likang Zhang | 2 |
| Lixing You | 2 |
| Yang Li | 2 |
| Zhen Wang | 2 |
| Bingze Yan | 1 |
| Chengzhi Peng | 1 |
| Hao Min | 1 |
| Hao-Kun Mao | 1 |
| Jia Huang | 1 |
| Jianwei Pan | 1 |
| Jigang Ren | 1 |
| Juan Yin | 1 |
| Liying Han | 1 |