1
talks
6
posters
0
committee roles
0
leadership roles
2017–2025
years active
Contributions
QIP QCrypt TQC presenter award · △program ◇steering ○organising □local · filled = chair
Talks
| Title | Conference | Type | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spanning tree packing algorithm for conference secret key propagation and GHZ distillation | QCRYPT 2024 | regular | Justus Neumann, Hermann Kampermann, Dagmar Bruss |
Networks of nodes connected by pairwise quantum key distribution (QKD) links are actively developing now. We consider the following problem: Given pairwise secret keys from QKD, how to agree on a common (conference) key for the whole network using classical communication? We propose an algorithm based on spanning tree packing from the graph theory and prove its optimality. The same algorithm can be applied for the GHZ distillation in pair-entangled networks. |
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Posters
| Title | Conference | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|
| Security of Iterative Sifting in Quantum Key Distribution | QCRYPT 2025 | Yien Liang, Hermann Kampermann, Dagmar Bruß |
We investigate the security of a quantum key distribution scheme, where Bob right after each detection announces publicly his choice of measurement basis, and the measurement results if the measurement is performed in the testing basis (used for parameter estimation). Such a scheme saves memory and communication time on both sides by not sending all the classical information only at the end of each block but immediately after each detection. We prove its security and show that this method will not reduce the key rate compared to conventional sifting. |
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| Quantum conference key agreement in pair-entangled networks | QCRYPT 2025 | Justus Neumann, Dagmar Bruß, Hermann Kampermann |
We investigate the problem of conference key agreement in pair entangled networks (PEN) where
the parties can share bipartite entangled states. In such networks, a source whose global state
factorizes into bipartite “pair-entangled network” (PEN) states is distributed to honest parties
which can perform local operations and public classical post-processing (LOSR+PP) to establish
a shared secret key among each other. In this setting, we derive several new upper bounds on the
achievable conference key rate. In particular for pure PEN states we show that the optimal key rate
can be achieved by a bipartite QKD strategy. |
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| Urban passive state QKD experiment | QCRYPT 2024 | Yury Kurochkin, Marios Papadovasilakis, Rodrigo Piera, James A. Grieve |
One of the most important requirements for the correct operation of the BB84 protocol is the preparation of the true random state. Most realizations follow this logic: Alice prepares random quantum states, measures them to extract random numbers, and then uses them to modulate the state of the transmitted light. The alternative approach is passive state preparation. It was proposed in 2010 and recently studied for security aspects. The idea is to use the natural phase randomness of the laser pulses to prepare random states. This approach can help to solve the security problem of correlating the state modulation voltage. Originally, the focus was on preparing the polarization state. This required two lasers or an additional intensity modulator. In this work, we use a laser that generates random phase pairs of subsequent pulses as a ready-to-use qubit. This allows us to simplify the Alice device. To perform a full phase characterization, we split a portion of the signal, convert it to polarization, and perform polarization tomography where we postselect four BB84 states. Without a decoy state, this QKD system is well suited for the last mile of a star quantum network with a loss budget of up to 10 dB. We have experimentally demonstrated passive state QKD over 10km deployed and spool fiber obtaining 10-100 bps of secret key correspondingly. |
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| On the use of pseudorandom quantum states in quantum cryptography | QCRYPT 2017 | Pavel Tregubov, Eugenii Kiktenko, Yuriy Kurochkin, Aleksey Fedorov |
| QKD network on mixed encoding schemes | QCRYPT 2017 | Evgeny Kiktenko, Nikolay Pozhar, Maxim Anufriev, Alexander Duplinsky, Alan Kanapin, Alexander Miller, Vadim Rodimin, Alexander Sokolov, Vasily Ustimchik, Sergey Vorobey, Anton Losev, Aleksey Fedorov, Vladimir Kurochkin, Yury Kurochkin |
| Maintaining quantum-secured blockchain with urban fiber quantum key distribution network | QCRYPT 2017 | Evgenii Kiktenko, Nikolay Pozhar, Maxim Anufriev, Ruslan Yunusov, Yuriy Kurochkin, Alexander Lvovsky, Aleksey Fedorov |
Collaborators
| Co-author | Joint talks |
|---|---|
| Aleksey Fedorov | 3 |
| Hermann Kampermann | 3 |
| Dagmar Bruß | 2 |
| Justus Neumann | 2 |
| Maxim Anufriev | 2 |
| Nikolay Pozhar | 2 |
| Yuriy Kurochkin | 2 |
| Yury Kurochkin | 2 |
| Alan Kanapin | 1 |
| Alexander Duplinsky | 1 |
| Alexander Lvovsky | 1 |
| Alexander Miller | 1 |
| Alexander Sokolov | 1 |
| Anton Losev | 1 |
| Dagmar Bruss | 1 |
| Eugenii Kiktenko | 1 |
| Evgenii Kiktenko | 1 |
| Evgeny Kiktenko | 1 |
| James A. Grieve | 1 |
| Marios Papadovasilakis | 1 |