1
talks
1
posters
0
committee roles
0
leadership roles
2021–2025
years active
Contributions
QIP QCrypt TQC presenter award · △program ◇steering ○organising □local · filled = chair
Talks
| Title | Conference | Type | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|---|
| MDI-QKD with 19.2 km free-space channel | QCRYPT 2021 | regular | Yuan Cao, Yu-Huai Li, Kui-Xing Yang, Yang-Fan Jiang, Shuang-Lin Li, Xiao-Long Hu, Maimaiti Abulizi, Weijun Zhang, Qi-Chao Sun, Wei-Yue Liu, Xiao Jiang, Sheng-Kai Liao, Ji-Gang Ren, Hao Li, Lixing You, Zhen Wang, Juan Yin, Chao-Yang Lu, Xiang-Bin Wang, Qiang Zhang, Cheng-Zhi Peng, Jian-Wei Pan |
Posters
| Title | Conference | Co-authors |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing Loophole-Free Bell Test with Classical Sources | QCRYPT 2025 | Su-Yi Cheng, Hai-Hao Dong, Xingjian Zhang, Jin Lin, Wen-Zhao Liu, Hu Li, Bing Bai, Li Li, Yang Liu, Jun Zhang, Xiao Jiang, Qiang Zhang, Jian-Wei Pan |
Recent advances in loophole-free Bell tests have profoundly impacted quantum cryptography, yet their security assumes trusted random number generators (RNGs) for measurement choices—a vulnerability termed the freedom-of-choice loophole. Here, we demonstrate that classical systems can spoof Bell violations under ostensibly loophole-free conditions using compromised RNGs. By synchronizing laser-generated separable states with imperfect RNG outputs in an optical setup, we simulate a CHSH test closing locality and detection loopholes. With full RNG access, we achieve a near-maximal CHSH value of 3.99, exceeding quantum limits. Crucially, partial RNG knowledge suffices: predetermining 10.6% of bits reproduces our “loophole free” optical system's CHSH value of 2.007, while Santha-Vazirani generators with 0.38-biased bits enable optimal spoofing. Even weakly correlated RNGs coordinated via entangled states—deviating by 0.04 from independence—allow violations. Prediction-based ratio analysis gives a P-value upper bound of 10^(-18266), misleadingly implying non-classicality if RNG flaws are ignored. Strikingly, we extract "device-independent" random bits from simulated outcomes, mirroring cryptographic protocols. This exposes a critical flaw: compromised input randomness invalidates security guarantees in Bell-inequality-based cryptography. Our findings mandate rigorous verification of both RNG integrity and Bell violations to ensure quantum cryptographic security. |
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Collaborators
| Co-author | Joint talks |
|---|---|
| Jian-Wei Pan | 2 |
| Qiang Zhang | 2 |
| Xiao Jiang | 2 |
| Bing Bai | 1 |
| Chao-Yang Lu | 1 |
| Cheng-Zhi Peng | 1 |
| Hai-Hao Dong | 1 |
| Hao Li | 1 |
| Hu Li | 1 |
| Ji-Gang Ren | 1 |
| Jin Lin | 1 |
| Juan Yin | 1 |
| Jun Zhang | 1 |
| Kui-Xing Yang | 1 |
| Li Li | 1 |
| Lixing You | 1 |
| Maimaiti Abulizi | 1 |
| Qi-Chao Sun | 1 |
| Sheng-Kai Liao | 1 |
| Shuang-Lin Li | 1 |