Alper Cakan

Unclonable cryptography leverages the quantum no-cloning principle to achieve strong security guarantees that are impossible to achieve in a classical world. Most existing works in this area only consider the basic single-copy security, and there been only a few works that achieve the more realistic notion of \emph{collusion-resistance} (where adversary receives multiple keys), which is the gold standard in cryptography. Further, existing works that do consider collusion-resistance have convoluted non-black-box solutions, and are highly tailored to their own applications, with little hope to generalize, and they often re-invent the tools from both single-key quantum cryptography as well as collusion-resistant classical cryptography. Moreover, the question of \emph{multi-copy security}, where the adversary receives multiple copies of the same state (rather than merely getting multiple independently sampled keys) is almost completely open. In this work, we develop a large toolset of black-box compilers and technical lemmata for dealing with collusion-resistance and multi-copy security in quantum cryptography. Using our toolset, we obtain a large number of new feasibility results with black-box constructions, with proofs that are significantly \emph{simpler} than the existing proofs in literature. In particular, we introduce a generic compiler that upgrades single-key secure quantum protection (copy-protection/LOCC leakage-resilience/secure leasing) schemes for decryption keys to collusion-resistant secure schemes. Then, we also introduce a generic compiler that upgrades collusion-resistant primitives to achieve multi-copy security, assuming only one-way functions. Using our toolset, we obtain a large number of new feasibility results. We obtain the first multi-copy secure constructions of public-key quantum money (termed quantum coins), single-decryptor encryption (SDE), unclonable encryption, and more. We obtain the first collusion-resistant secure key-leasing scheme with a fully classical lessor. Finally, we obtain the first LOCC leakage-resilient PKE scheme with multi-copy security, thus making progress towards achieving \emph{quantum key-fire} in the plain model. Finally, as part of our toolset, we also show various technical results, such as the collusion-resistant analogue of the \emph{one-way-to-hiding (O2H) lemma}, a quantum-state analogue of the small-range-distributions lemma, a \emph{quantum pigeonhole lemma} for entangled adversaries and the first deterministic signature scheme with quantum-query security. We also show that independent-challenge security implies identical-challenge security in collusion-resistant copy-protection search games, and thus we obtain the first schemes with such security.

Is it possible to comprehensively destroy a piece of quantum information, so that nothing is left behind except the memory of that one had it at some point? For example, various works, most recently Morimae, Poremba, and Yamakawa (TQC '24), show how to construct a signature scheme with certified deletion where a user who deletes a signature on m cannot later produce a signature for m. However, in all of the existing schemes, even after deletion the user is still able keep irrefutable evidence that m was signed, and thus they do not fully capture the spirit of deletion. In this work, we initiate the study of certified deniability in order to obtain a more comprehensive notion of deletion. Certified deniability uses a simulation-based security definition, ensuring that any information the user has kept after deletion could have been learned without being given the deleteable object to begin with; meaning that deletion leaves no trace behind! We define and construct two non-interactive primitives that satisfy certified deniability in the quantum random oracle model: signatures and non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments (NIZKs). As a consequence, for example, it is not possible to delete a signature/NIZK and later provide convincing evidence that it used to exist. Notably, our results utilize uniquely quantum phenomena to bypass Pass's (CRYPTO '03) celebrated result showing that deniable NIZKs are impossible even in the random oracle model.

Recent work of Bostanci, Nehoran, Zhandry (STOC'25, QIP'25) formalized the notion of quantum fire: A quantum state that can be cloned efficiently but cannot be converted to a classical string. Nehoran and Zhandry (QIP'23) gave a construction of quantum fire relative to an (inefficient) unitary quantum oracle, and proved its correctness and security. Bostanci et al (STOC'25, QIP'25) gave a candidate construction of quantum fire based on cryptographic group action assumptions, and proved its correctness. However, they do not have a proof of security, and the security is only conjectured without any justification at all. In this work, we give the first construction of (public-key) quantum fire relative to a classical oracle, and prove its correctness and security. This resolves the open question posed by Bostanci et al (STOC'25, QIP'25) and Nehoran and Zhandry (QIP'23). Further, assuming existence of one-way functions, our scheme can also be made efficient. We note that, even in the unitary quantum oracle setting, no efficient quantum fire scheme existed: Nehoran-Zhandry show that their unitary oracle cannot be made efficient. Implications to Physics: In quantum mechanics, various fundamental principles called no-go properties exist, such as no-cloning theorem, no-hiding theorem, no-deleting theorem, no-telegraphing theorem and so on. Most of these no-go properties have been shown to be equivalent to each other. However, our result gives the first (classical oracle) separation between no-go properties of quantum mechanics! Our result means that, relative to a classical oracle, no-telegraphing does not imply no-cloning. Note that, in the information-theoretic setting, no-cloning and no-telegraphing are equivalent. Our result means that the equivalency of the fundamental no-go principles of quantum mechanics that we take for granted might not hold in a computational world!

Quantum information allows us to build quantum money schemes, where a bank can issue banknotes in the form of authenticatable quantum states that cannot be cloned or counterfeited: a user in possession of k banknotes cannot produce k + 1 banknotes. Similar to paper banknotes, in existing quantum money schemes, a banknote consists of an unclonable quantum state and a classical serial number, signed by the bank. Thus, they lack one of the most fundamental properties cryptographers look for in a currency scheme: privacy/anonymity. In this work, we construct the first public-key quantum coin scheme, that is, a money scheme where all banknotes are identical. Assuming existence of subspace-hiding obfuscation, we construct a public-key quantum coin scheme. Further, we show that quantum coins do not necessarily provide privacy against all adversaries. Therefore, we develop formal definitions of privacy for quantum money schemes. Then, we construct the first public-key quantum money schemes that satisfy these security notions. Namely, assuming existence of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and hardness of Learning with Errors (LWE), we construct a public-key quantum money scheme with anonymity against users and traceability by authorities. a public-key quantum money scheme with untraceability (i.e. not even the bank/authorities can track banknotes). As another application, we show that the no-cloning principle allows us to construct schemes, with advanced security guarantees that are classically impossible, for a seemingly unrelated application: voting! Assuming existence of iO and hardness of LWE, we construct a universally verifiable quantum voting scheme with classical votes. Finally, to achieve our results, we develop a variety of technical tools, which we believe might be of independent interest. We show a new result called quantum-state read-once small-range distributions, which shows how to simulate superposition query access to an exponential size oracle with quantum-state outputs using single copy each of polynomially many state samples. We construct a deterministic classical signature scheme secure against quantum-query access to the signing oracle. We construct publicly rerandomizable encryption with strong correctness from LWE, where no adversary is able to produce a malicious ciphertext and a malicious random tape such that the ciphertext before and after rerandomization (with the malicious tape) decrypts to different values.

Quantum no-cloning theorem gives rise to the intriguing possibility of quantum copy protection where we encode a program or functionality in a quantum state such that a user in possession of k copies cannot create k + 1 copies, for any k. Introduced by Aaronson (CCC’09) over a decade ago, copy protection has proven to be notoriously hard to achieve. Previous work has been able to achieve copy-protection for various functionalities only in restricted models: (i) in the bounded collusion setting where k → k + 1 security is achieved for a-priori fixed collusion bound k (in the plain model with the same computational assumptions as ours, by Liu, Liu, Qian, Zhandry [TCC’22]), or, (ii) only k → 2k security is achieved (relative to a structured quantum oracle, by Aaronson [CCC’09]). In this work, we give the first unbounded collusion-resistant (i.e. multiple-copy secure) copy protection schemes, answering the long-standing open question of constructing such schemes, raised by multiple previous works starting with Aaronson (CCC’09). More specifically, we obtain the following results. We construct (i) public-key encryption, (ii) public-key functional encryption, (iii) signature and (iv) pseudorandom function schemes whose keys are copy-protected against unbounded collusions in the plain model (i.e. without any idealized oracles), assuming (post-quantum) subexponentially secure iO and LWE. We show that any unlearnable functionality can be copy-protected against unbounded collusions, relative to a classical oracle. As a corollary of our results, we rule out the existence of hyperefficient quantum shadow tomography, – even given non-black-box access to the measurements, assuming subexponentially secure iO and LWE, or, – unconditionally relative to a quantumly accessible classical oracle, and hence answer an open question by Aaronson (STOC’18). We obtain our results through a novel technique which uses identity-based encryption to construct multiple copy secure copy-protection schemes from 1-copy → 2-copy secure schemes. We believe our technique is of independent interest. Along the way, we also obtain the following results. We define and prove the security of new collusion-resistant monogamy-of-entanglement games for coset states. We construct a classical puncturable functional encryption scheme whose master secret key can be punctured at all functions f such that f(m0) ̸= f(m1).

Can an adversary compromise the security of our system by obtaining information on sensitive data such as cryptographic keys through side-channels? Even worse, can an adversary hack into our computer and simply steal them? This question is almost as old as the Internet and significant effort has been spent on designing mechanisms to prevent and detect such attacks. Once quantum computers arrive, will the situation remain the same or can we hope to live in a better world? We first consider ubiquitous side-channel attacks, which aim to leak side information on secret system components, studied in the leakage-resilient cryptography literature. Classical leakage-resilient cryptography must necessarily impose restrictions on the type of leakage one aims to protect against. As a notable example, the most well-studied leakage model is that of bounded leakage, where it is assumed that an adversary learns at most L bits of leakage on secret components, for some leakage bound L. Although this leakage bound is necessary, many real-world side-channel attacks cannot be captured by bounded leakage. In this work, we design cryptographic schemes that provide guarantees against arbitrary side channel attacks: - Using techniques from unclonable quantum cryptography, we design several basic leakage- resilient primitives, such as public- and private-key encryption, (weak) pseudorandom functions, digital signatures and quantum money schemes which remain secure under (polynomially) unbounded classical leakage. In particular, this leakage can be much longer than the (quantum) secret being leaked upon. In our view, leakage is the result of observations of quantities such as power consumption and hence is most naturally viewed as classical information. Notably, the leakage-resilience of our schemes holds even in the stronger “LOCC leakage” model where the adversary can obtain adaptive leakage for unbounded number of rounds. - What if the adversary simply breaks into our system to steal our secret keys, rather than mounting only a side-channel attack?What if the adversary can even tamper with the data arbitrarily, for example to cover its tracks? We initiate the study of intrusion detection in the quantum setting, where one would like to detect if security has been compromised even in the face of an arbitrary intruder attack which can leak and tamper with classical as well as quantum data. We design cryptographic schemes supporting intrusion-detection for a host of primitives such as public- and private-key encryption, digital signature, functional encryption, program obfuscation and software protection. Our schemes are based on techniques from cryptography with secure key leasing and certified deletion.

Given the devastating security compromises caused by side-channel attacks on existing classical systems, can we store our private data encoded as a quantum state so that they can be kept private in the face of arbitrary side-channel attacks? The unclonable nature of quantum information allows us to build various quantum protection schemes for cryptographic information such as secret keys. Examples of quantum protection notions include copy-protection, secure leasing, and finally, unbounded leakage-resilience, which was recently introduced by C¸ akan, Goyal, Liu-Zhang and Ribeiro (TCC’24). C¸ akan et al show that secrets of various cryptographic schemes (such as cryptographic keys or secret shares) can be protected by storing them as quantum states so that they satisfy LOCC (local operation and classical communication) leakage-resilience: the scheme can tolerate any unbounded amount of adaptive leakage over unbounded rounds. As a special case (dubbed 1-round leakage), this also means that those quantum states cannot be converted to classical strings (without completely losing their functionality). In this work, we continue the study of unbounded/LOCC leakage-resilience and consider new primitives and even stronger security notions. • Assuming the existence of a classical X ∈ {secret-key encryption, public-key encryption} scheme, we construct an X scheme with LOCC leakage-resilient ciphertexts. This guarantees that an adversary who obtains LOCC-leakage on ciphertexts cannot learn anything about their contents, even if they obtain the secret key later on. • Assuming the existence of a classical signature scheme and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), we construct a signature scheme with LOCC leakage-resilient signatures. This guarantees that an adversary who obtains LOCC-leakage on various signatures cannot produce any valid signatures at all other than the ones it obtained honestly! • Assuming the existence of one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), we construct a NIZK proof system with LOCC leakage-resilient proofs. This guarantees that an adversary who obtains LOCC-leakage on a NIZK proof of an hard instance cannot produce a valid proof! • Finally, we introduce the notion of post-challenge unbounded leakage-resilient encryption. This is a new security definition where the adversary receives the challenge ciphertext before obtaining leakage. This is ensures that for any scheme that satisfies this notion, all future and past communications will be secure even in the face of unbounded leakage resilience. This is in stark constrast to previous work, which only guarantees security of future communications after leakage. We give a secure construction in the quantum random oracle model, assuming existence of iO and hardness of LWE.